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This paper reports on the results of an empirical investigation into the objectives of daily foreign
exchange market intervention by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System in the
U.S. dollar-deutsche mark market. Tobit analysis is implemented to estimate the intervention
reaction functions consistently. It is found that an increase in the conditional variance in daily
exchange rate returns derived from a GARCH model estimated in the paper, led the Bundesbank
and the Fed to increase the volume of intervention, both in case of dollar-sales and purchases on
account of their leaning against the wind policy.In this study the objectives of official intervention by central banks in the U.S. dollar-
deutsche mark will be ezamined. An attempt will be made to determine empirical(y the short term
reaction functions with regard to the dollarlDM exchange mazket intervention by both the Deut-
sche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System. Pazticular attention will be paid to the
respective central banks' behavior towards anticipated exchange market volatility. Applications of
the GARCH model reveal that volatility is predictable in most financial markets (for a survey, see
Bollerslev et al. (1990)). Shocks in daily exchange rate returns in period t show a long term
persistence onto the conditional volatility in period tfs for lazge s. The conditional variance of
daily returns in the U.S. dollar~leutsche mazk exchange market will be used as a prozy for the ex
ante exchange rate risk. It is expected that the central banks try to compress the perceived risk by
means of direct foreign exchange market operations.
The study concentrates on intervention of both central banks in the spot dollar~DM
exchange market. Daily observations for the official interventions are used. Focus is on 'active'
intervention which takes place inside the do11azIDM exchange mazket. It is well known that
foreign ezchange mazket participants are eager to detect any information related to official foreign
ezchange intervention. Central bankers, in turn, know that their actions are monitored very
carefully. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that all interventions undertalcen inside the
dollaz~DM exchange market are intended to influence the price formation on the market. 'Passive'
intervention which takes place outside the market is left out of consideration.
The data available to this study run from Februazy 1985 through to October 1990. As
relevant subsamples have been selected four periods of at least three months with prolonged
intervention in one direction: September 1987-January 1988, June 1988-September 1988,
December 1988-June 1989 and August 1989-October 1989. These periods aze all situated after the
Louvre Agreement of February 22, 1987. Therefore, the same exchange rate policy regime
applies to each making them comparable in at least one respect.
The next section examines the stated objectives of exchange market intervention by central
banks in the G-7 countries in general and by the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve in particular.
Section II presents an update of the empirical results in Eijffinger and Gruijters (1991) for periods
of at least three months. The volume of Bundesbank and Fed intervention is regressed on a
constant and the difference between the actual level and (a proxy for) the desired level of the U.S.
dollar in terms of deutsche marks. Section III discusses the relevance of using the information
contained in the conditional variance tale of daily returns in the dollar-mazk ezchange market as
an additional regressor in the short term reaction function for daily interventions. Furthermore,
OLS estimation results for the amended Bundesbank and Federal Reserve intervention reaction
1functions are presented. Section IVi centers on the actual inappropriateness of the simple OI,S
estimation technique used in section III. Tobit analysis is implemented to deal with the problem of
a large proportion of zero-observations for the dependent variable in the reaction functions.
Section V contains a summary and concluding remarks.
I. Objectives ot Exchange Market Interventions by Central Banks
In the short term all central banks have a common objective of "countering disorderly
exchange market conditions". It is part of their commitment to promote a stable exchange rate
system in accordance with Article IV of the ARicles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund as amended in 1978. As stated by the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention
(1983) and repeated by Dudler (1988), "disorderly market conditions" are indicated by a substanti-
al widening of bid-asked spreads, large intraday exchange rate movements, "thin" or highly
uncertain trading, destabilising impacts of essentially non-economic shocks and self-sustaining
exchange rate movements which may gain a momentum of their own. The medium term objectives
regard to resisting large short term exchange rate movements or "erratic fluctuations" which
exceed a certain size, buying time by the central banks to reassess their policies and "leaning
against the wind" which has been pursued by some over short periods and by others over longer
periods. The long term objectives vary from resisting exchange rate movements which are
believed to be unjustified with respect to the fundamentals (inflation, money growth, balance of
payments accounts, etc.) and attempts to give some leeway to monetary policy by lessening the
foreign impact on domestic monetary conditions, to resisting depreciation because of its inflatio-
nary effects and resisting appreciation in order to maintain competitiveness. Other objectives are
e.g. attempts to acquire foreign currencies without generating (renewed) downward pressure on
the domestic currency.
According to the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention (1983) the Bundesbank
"(...) has sought from the onset of floating to counter disorderly market conditions, dampen
'erratic' short-term exchange rate fluctuations and smooth out excessive swings in the DMN.S.
dollar rate over longer periods" (p.13) whereas Smith and Madigan (1988) state that "for the
period since March 1973 as a whole (...) it is probably correct to say that the United States had
no exchange rate objective" (p.188). Obviously, for the large U.S. economy exchange rate
movements are relatively unimportant in their ultimate repercussions on domestic growth and
inflation. Therefore, as its maximum tolerable exchange rate changes are smaller, the Bundesbank
will feel the need to intervene earlier than the Fed for given movements of the U.S. dollarlDM-
2rate. On the other hand, the weight assigned to exchange rate stabilization might be larger for the
Federal Reserve after the L.ouvre Accord. While coordinated interventions are ezpecteà to have a
larger chance of affecting the development of the exchange rate through their larger announcement
effect, the Bundesbank will urge the Fed to do its bit, or the other way around.
Previous empirical studies to intervention reaction functions of central banlcs refer to the
longer term objectives of exchange market intervention and have used monthly or quarterly
intervention data (for a survey, see Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1991). These studies usually
ignore or deduct from the short term strategy of "countering disorderly market conditions" which
results in the smoothing of exchange rate volatility from day to day and even during the day.
Our empirical study deliberately focuses on the shorter term objectives of intervention in
the dollar-DM exchange market. Daily intervention data of the Bundesbank and the Federal
Reserve are used. The disadvantage of such an approach is the vanishing relation between
intervention and the "fundamentals" which are measured on monthly or quarterly base. Neverthe-
less, this approach has a decisive advantage, because it captures better the frequency and pattern
of exchange market intervention with respect to "countering disorderly market conditions" and
"leaning against the wind" over shorter periods. Thereby, it should be noticed that the intervention
behavior of central banks is not only reflected in the direction and volume, but also in the timing
and technique of intervention. The timing refers to the question whether the exchange market is
"thin" and uncertain or not, while the technique relates to the way in which a central bank
implements its intervention, i.e. by domestic and possibly foreign commercial banks or by
currency brokers with different announcement effects.
Despite the importance of both timing' and technique for intervention behavior, these
elements can not be taken into account by our study and will surely detract from the explanatory
power of the intervention reaction functions.
The majority of the previous studies formulate the reaction function rather ad hoc. In
some studies, however, it is derived formally by combining a policy loss function for the central
bank with a set of equations describing the determination of the exchange rate (SJ. In the latter
case much depends on the initial formulation of the loss function (L.J which is to be minimized
with respect to the constraints implied by the exchange rate model to arrive at the actual
intervention reaction function. A common assumption is that the central bank wishes to limit
deviations from a target level for the exchange rate (S~):
(1) 4 - (S~ - S~~Z
3To capture intervention carried out on account of a"leaning against the wind" policy, the tazget
level for the exchange rate can be thought of as representing past levels of the exchange rate. This
follows immediately from the definition of smoothing exchange rate fluctuatioas: whether or not
the exchange rate was considered to be at a desirable level in the previous period(s), deviations
from the tazget level will be countered.
Neumann (1984) implements a flow mazket model for the determination of the exchange
rate. He derives an intervention reaction function according to which the central bank of the home
country supplies amounts of foreign currency to the mazket when the exchange rate of the foreign
currency in terms of the home currency is lower than the tazget rate (S, c S,') and when an
increase in the expected risk premium on assets denominated in the home currency raises
speculative demand for that currency. It should be noticed that the serious measurement problems
surrounding "risk premiums" aze well established.
II. An Empirical Study of the Reaction Functions of the Deutsche Bundesbank and the
Federal Reserve System.
An empirical study of the reaction function for daily interventions by the Deutsche
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System in the spot U.S. dollar~eutsche mark exchange
mazket must take account of the development of the dollar-DM exchange rate between successive
days (interday), as well as in the course of these days (intraday~. In this study the intraday
development is approximated by three observations per day:
1. the opening rate (primo) at 8.30 hours;
2, the fixing rate (official middle rate) at 13.00 hours;
3. the closing rate (ultimo) at 16:30 hours in Frankfurt time.
Because the opening and closing rates are only available since February 1985', as sample is
chosen the period from February 1985 until October 1990. Furthermore, the study makes use of
daily observations for the official interventions in the dollar-DM exchange mazket, which can be
divided in two parts:`
a. U.S. dollar-interventions of the Deutsche Bundesbank expressed in deutsche marks against
the DMldollar intervention rate of that day;
b. DM-interventions of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, acting on behalf of the
Federal Reserve System, so far as these operations affect the net foreign position of the
Bundesbank. This happens e.g. when the Federal Reserve finances its DM-sales by calling
on the swap agreement with the Bundesbank or from its DM-balances at the Bundesbank,
4or when the Federal Reserve invests its DM-purchases at the Bundesbank.
The sample period (February 1985-October 1990) consists of 1439 trading days. On the majority
of these days no interventions were carried out by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve
System. Months which comprise less than four interventions are left out of consideration. As
relevant subsamples have been selected four periods of at least three months with prolonged
interventions in one direction by either of the central banks. The reason for this will be explained
in the next section.
The first period runs from September 1987 (for the Fed: October 1987) to January 1988.
It seems that during this period, the G-3 countries were no longer willing to direct monetary
policy at stabilizing ezchange rates as was agreed upon at the Louvre meeting. Furthermore, the
October 1987 stock market crash is likely to have caught exchange market participants off
balance, calling for dollar supporting intervention.
In the first half of 1988, the U.S. dollar recovered gradually from its steep decline in the
aftermath of the stock market crash. The dollar's upward movement against the mark strengthened
vigorously during the second period considered in this paper, June 1988 through September 1988.
It appeared to be possible for the U.S. economy to experience a relatively strong growth without
frustrating external adjustment. The announcement of U.S. trade deficits which were much smaller
than expected made exchange market participants to anticipate a further appreciation of the
dollar.' Coordinated central bank interventions in August 1988 to counteract this rise was
supported by the Bundesbank's move, on August 25, to raise its discount rate by '~4 percentage
point leading to a narrowing of the interest differential in favor of the dollar.
The third period runs from December 1988 to March 1989 for the Bundesbank. For the
Federal Reserve System it begins in January 1989 and ends in June 1989. Political strains in
Germany and Japan on the one hand, and a widening short-term interest differential favoring the
U.S. dollar over the deutsche mark on the other hand put the value of the dollar under upward
pressure. Thereby, the market temporarily overiooked the structural weakness of the U.S. dollar
caused by the persistent U.S. 'twin deficit'. The buoyancy of the dollar and thus the perceived
need for (U.S.) intervention finally subsided in late June 1989. Indications of a deceleration of
economic growth and a lessening of inflationary pressure led to market expectations of an easier
U.S. monetary policy stance and lower short-term interest rates.
As fourth period is chosen August 1989-October 1989. During this period, again, the
dollar came under upward pressure. The currency was strengthened by lower than expected U.S.
trade deficits for June and July released on August 17 and September 15, respectively, and
favorable employment and retail sales data lowering the probability, as perceived by market
5participants, of an easing of U.S. monetary policy. By means of official sales of dollars, in part
undertaken after a G-7 meeting on September 23, the Bundesbank and the Fed tried to convince
market participants that the G-7 monetary authorities were firmly committed to resisting the
dollar's rise and maintaining ezchange rate stability.
Quirk (1977), when using monthly data, distinguishes intervention on account of a
"leaning against the wind" policy, given by
(2) INV, - a (S, - Sa,)
from intervention consistent with gliding pazities calculated as a moving average of previous levels
of the exchange rate which is of the form
(3) INV, - b(S, - E a; S,.;), with E a; - 1
i r
where INV, is the volume of intervention expressed in the home currency and S, is the spot
exchange rate (home currency price of foreign currency). The same two specifications can be
distinguished when daily data aze used; the latter specification is central to the investigations in
Eijffinger and Gruijters (1991) of which an update will be presented in this section"
The interventions by the Deutsche Bundesbank (INV,oBB) and the Federal Reserve System
(INV,~) in the U.S. dollaz-deutsche mazk exchange market are explained by a constant and the
difference between the opening rate of the dollar in DM (S,P) and the seven-days moving average
of the opening rate, fixing rate (S,~ and closing rate (S,`~ of the dollaz:
(4)
~
INV,nse~em - ao f a~ (~P - 1l21 E S~~P~PN) ~~
e"I
where p, is the residual of the reaction function. The exchange market interventions by the
Bundesbank and Federal Reserve aze both expressed in billions of deutsche marks. The interventi-
ons are positive if the central bank buys dollars in return for deutsche marks. The dollar-DM rate
is defined as the spot value of one dollar expressed in DM at the Frankfurt exchange. The
constant (ao) reflects, when significant, a bias of the intervening central bank with respect to the
dollar-DM rate based on the development of the "fundamentals", such as the (long) capital
acwunt, the current account, the inflation rate and the growth rate of the money stock in Germany
and the United States. A positive constant represents an autonomous bias of the central bank
concerned towards a dollar appreciation vis-d-vis the deutsche mark in the medium (and long)
run'. The smoothing or "leaning against the wind" coefficient (a,) reflects the reaction of the
6central bank by exchange market intervention on a deviation of the actual ezchange rate - i.e. the
opening rate of the day - from the desired exchange rate. As a proxy for the desired rate is chosen
a moving average of the opening, fixing and closing rates during the previous seven days. While
the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve are supposed to pursue a policy of "leaning againstthe
wind", the smoothing coefficient is expected to have a negative sign. This means that the central
banks try to dampen the volatility of the dollar-DM rate in the short-run by exchange market
intervention.'
[Insert Table 1 here]
The results from estimating equation (4) by ordinary least squares (OL.S) are reported in
Table 1. The constant (a~ is significant in all eight regressions. For the first subsample it has a
positive sign consistent with the fact that both central banks only bought U.S. dollazs during that
period. The opposite case applies to the other three subsamples. The smoothing or "leaning
against the wind" coefficient (a,) has the expected negative sign except for the fourth subsample.
In the case of the Bundesbank, this "leaning with the wind" is statistically significant. Neither a
closer inspection of the data nor a broad characterisation of the major economic issues during the
particulaz period reveal an explanation for this appazent "leaning with the wind" by both the
Bundesbank and the Fed. The announcement of a smaller than expected U.S. trade deficit in
August and September 1989 pushed the (value of the) dollar above DM 2.00 inducing dollar sales
by the central banks.
The values of the Durbin-Watson test statistic given in Table 1 clearly indicate that first-
order autocorrelation in the residuals of (4) is a problem. Although the lower bound of the critical
value for each regression varies with the number of observations in the subsample, it can easily be
checked that only for the fourth subsample in the case of the Federal Reserve the null hypothesis
of uncorrelated errors is not rejected. In the following sections a different specification of the
reaction function and a more appropriate estimation technique will be used to describe the
intervention behavior more satisfactory.
III. The Reaction Towards Anticipated F~cchange Rate Volatility
In the previous section the reaction of the central banks to a divergence of the actual from
the desired exchange rate was estimated. The desired level of the exchange rate was proxied by
the seven-days moving average of the exchange rate. Therefore, the central banks' reaction
patterns were assumed to be guided by realized values of the exchange rate.
7The evolution over time of the variance or standard deviation of exchange rate changes
and other statistical properties derived from the behavior of ezchange rates have recently become
an intensively studied subject. Several recent studies have applied Engle's [1982] autoregressive
conditionally heteroskedastic (ARCH) model and Bollerslev's [1986J extension to a generalized
ARCH (GARCH) model to describe time-varying variances in exchange rates. The purport of the
meanwhile extensive GARCH literature is that volatility in daily returns is predictable in most
financial markets. In several applications it has been shown that there is a long ternt persistence in
the effects of shocks in period t onto the conditional variance of exchange rates in period tfs for
large s. On the assumption that central banks are aware of this regularity, the forward looking
nature of foreign exchange market operations can be tested by including a conditional vaziance
term in the reaction function.
The investigations in this paper are concerned with exchange rate risk associated with
interday movements of the exchange rate only. Exchange rate risk associated with intraday
exchange rate developments in our opinion applies when studying noise-trading and the interaction
between central banks and exchange market participants which behave as 'chartists' (see e.g.
Allen and Taylor (1990) and Hung (1991) for a more extensive treatment of this subject)'. An
empirical investigation of this interaction would require the use of intradaily data of interventions,
exchange rates and even trading volumes.
The conditional variance of daily returns in the U.S. dollar-cieutsche mark exchange
market will be used as a proxy for the anticipated exchange rate volatility. An increase in the
conditional variance is not only likely to cause "disorderly market conditions" on the foreign
exchange market. It may have an adverse effect on the volume of international trade as well. Until
recently, the effect of exchange rate volatility on the volume of international trade remained an
unresolved issue. Theory is indeterminate on this issue.'a Furthermore, in a recent article Bini
Smaghi (1991) explains why it is so difficult to find any empirical relationship. Using sufficiently
disaggregated data on trade flows, he finds that, for the period 1976-1984, the standard deviation
of weekly rates of change of the intra-EMS effective exchange rate during a quarter had a
significantly negative effect on the volume of exports of the countries considered (Germany,
France and Italy) in the same quarter.
From the sample as a whole four periods of at least three months with prolonged
interventions in one direction by one of the central banks have been selected. This is done because
the variance of a time series is positive by definitiun and because it seems reasonable to expect a
central bank, ceteris paribus, either to buy or sell more U.S. dollars in case of an increase in the
conditional variance of the return series depending on the initial direction of intervention.
8Therefore, the expected sign of the coefficient for the conditional variance term in the intervention
reaction function is positive (negative) when the period is characterised by purchases (sales) of
U.S. dollazs by the cenual banks.
The periods selected are all situated after the establishment of the Louvre Agreement of
February 22, 1987. Estimation results in Almekinders (1991) point to a marked change in the
stochastic process generating the DM-U.S. dollar return series as of that date. Furthermore, it
appeared that the process remained relatively stable at least until October 1989. Therefore, the
sample period used to estimate the GARCH model runs from February 23, 1987 through to
October 31, 1989 totalling 677 observations. The model looks as follows:
(S)
100 (log S," - log S,-,") - bo f~
E~ ~ ~-1 ~ N(0. ~
h, - ~r ~- tx ~.,Z f f3 h,.,
with ~r, a, (3 ~0, af S G 1. The first line represents the mean equation of the model, expressed in
closing rates, (S`~, e, is the residual of the mean equation and the second line states that it has a
conditional normal distribution with mean zero and variance h~. ft~., indicates the information
available to exchange market participants as of time t-1. The third line of the model defines the
variance equation (h~. The maximum likelihood estimation results aze shown in Table 2. The
constant in the mean equation (bo) does not differ significantly from zero. Obviously, the
DMldollaz-rate did not increase uniformly across the sample. The high standard deviation of the
[Insert Table 2 here]
daily returns in the dollar-DM market renders an insignificant constant in the mean equation. The
other coefficients of the GARCH model in (5) are highly significant. The value of the likelihood
ratio (LR) test statístic in the last column of Table 2 indicates that the null hypothesis Ho: a-6-0
can be soundly rejected. This implies that the random walk model with a GARCH error term fits
the data better than the random walk model with a Gaussian error term. Although the residuals
still exhibit some excess kurtosis, it can be argued that the conditional normal specification in (5)
captures the stylized facts of the DMldollar-exchange rate fairly well. The estimation results
depicted in Table 2 are used to generate a series for the conditional variance of the daily
DMldollar-return. The unconditional or average variance of the return series" for the sample
considered in Table 2, aZ, is used as a stazting value:
9a2 - ~rl(1-a-4) - 0.42
The path of the conditional variance (hJ for the period from September 1987 to July 1988 can be
seen in Figure 1. An upturn of the conditional variance during the first period of prolonged
(dollaz-supporting) intervention stands out. A major strengthening of the U.S. dollaz vis-d-vrs the
DM marks the beginning of the second subsample.
(Insert Figure 1 here]
[Insert Figure 2 here]
The intervention reaction function for the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve
System including the conditional vaziance of the daily return in the U.S. dollaz-deutsche mark
mazket as an additional explanatory variable, looks as follows:
(6)
~
INV,oea~r~u - c,~ f c, (S,P - 1121 E S~~PIFN) {, ~ h~ .} ~
OLS estimation results for equation (6) are reported in Table 3. When comparing these results
with those in Table 1, is it obvious that the conditional variance coefficient (c~ draws explanatory
power away from the constant (co) while the smoothing or "leaning against the wind" coefficient
(c,) remains of equal magnitude approximately. Furthermore, the overall explanatory power of the
reaction function, as measured by the squared multiple correlation coefficient adjusted for degrees
of freedom, is higher and the problem of first-order autocorrelation in the residuals seems to have
become less severe. Most importantly, the conditional variance coefficient has the expected sign in
all cases. It is positive in the first subsample when both central banks only bought U.S. dollazs
and negative in the three remaining subsamples with the central banks selling U.S. dollars.
[Insert Table 3 here]
A straightforward interpretation of the estimated coefficients in the Bundesbank reaction
function for the sample period September 1987-Januazy 1988 could be the following. A one
pfennig decline of the actual level of the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar below the desired level
led the Bundesbank to buy DM 3.156 billion worth of U.S. dollazs on average. Furthermore, an
increase in the conditional vaziance by 10 points, say from 0.30 to 0.40, caused by a lazger than
average percentage change in the DMIS-exchange rate during the previous day, ceteris pazibus
10induced the Bundesbank to buy an additional DM 134 million worth of U.S. dollars. However,
the simple OLS estimation technique does in fact not yield consistent estimates for the coefficients
in the reaction functions when using a data set in which large proportions of the observations for
the dependent vaziable are at a limiting value, in this case zero. A correction is required for the
possibility that the one pfennig decline of the actual level of the exchange rate of the U.S. dollaz
below the desired level or the increase in the conditional variance by 10 points actually were
insufficient to lift the volume of intervention above zero. Tobit analysis, the appropriate method to
deal with this problem, will be implemented in the next section.
IV. The intervention Reaction Function estimated as a Tobit Model
The OLS estimation technique implemented in section 3 and 4 assumes that the residuals of the
reaction functions (pJ are independent of the explanatory variables. However, this assumption
does not hold when large proportions of the observations for the dependent variable in the reaction
function are zero, as is the case in the four subsamples selected above. A possible explanation for
the zero interventions is that the central bank does not carry out foreign exchange market
operations intended to alter the development of the exchange rate until the perceived necessity to
step in the market exceeds a certain level. Neither this necessity nor "negative" interventions,
corresponding to various levels of necessity below the threshold level, can be observed.'Z A
reaction function for necessazy intervention looks as follows
(~)
~
INV; - do t d, (S,P - 1121 E S~~PIFIU) t d2 h, f~t;
where INV; is the necessary amount of intervention and the residual ~ is assumed to be a
identically and independently distributed random variable with mean zero and variance aZ. The
relationship between observed and necessary intervention applying to both buying and selling of
foreign exchange is
(8) INV, - INV; if INV; ~ 0
- 0 if INV; 5 0
The coefficients in Table 3 aze biased estimators of do, d, and dZ in equation (7). Therefore, ~, is
not identically distributed with mean zero and variance a2.
In Tobit analysis, named after Tobin (1958) who pioneered this type of analysis, the parame-
I1ters in (7) are estimated consistently applying maximum likelihood procedures (for more details on
Tobit analysis, see the Appendix). Table 4 reports the Tobit regression results for equation (7). In
a qualitative sense these do not differ very much from the OLS results reported in Table 3. The
puzzling "leaning with the wind" coefficient in the fourth subsample for the Bundesbank is no
longer significant. The Tobit regression coefficients overstate the actual effect of unit changes in
(Insert Table 4 here]
the explanatory variables on the volume of intervention. A correction is required for the
possibility that for instance an increase in the divergence of the actual spot rate from the seven-
days moving average of the exchange rate does not lead to nonzero interventions. Therefore, the
coefficients in Table 4 have to be multiplied by the expected probability that the volume of
intervention is larger (in the first subsample for both central banks) or smaller (in the other
subsamples) than zero. This probability can be derived from the Tobit regression equation with
the independent variables set equal to their mean values. For each regression it is given in Table
4. These probabilities grosso modo correspond with the (order of) the actual proportions of
intervention days in each subsample. At first sight, the expected probability in the second
subsample for the Bundesbank, 0.6421, seems to be an outlier. However, the Bundesbank interve-
ned on 57 of the 86 trading-days from June 1988 through September 1988, the calculated
proportion of intervention days being 57I86-0.663. In the other cases, the calculated probabilities
underestimate the proportion of days with nonzero interventions.
V. Conclusions
The estimation results presented in this study indicate that both the Bundesbank and the
Federal Reserve System conducted their official foreign exchange operations consistently. Daily
intervention data were available. This made it possible to test whether intervention by the
Bundesbank and the Fed was guided by their commitment to promote a stable exchange rate
system and, thus, whether they tried to counter "disorderly market conditions" from day to day. A
"leaning against the wind" policy appears to have prevailed across four post-Louvre subsamples of
at least three months. In one of the subsamples, a significant "leaning with the wind" coefficient
was found initially. However, it turned insignificant when Tobit analysis, the appropriate
estimation techniyue given the large proportion of zero~bservations for the volume of interventi-
on, was implemented.
12The "leaning against the wind" coefficient relates the volume of intervention on day t to the
difference between the opening rate of the U.S. dollaz in deutsche marks at the Frankfurt foreign
exchange market and a seven-days moving average of the opening, fixing and closing rate. It
should be noticed that the moving average refers to realized values of the ezchange rate. An
attempt has been made to reveal a glimpse of the forward looking nature of foreign exchange
mazket operations by including a conditional variance term in the intervention reaction function. In
fact, this study investigates whether the central banks take into account, the well established
empirical regularity that daily returns on foreign exchange markets show clusters of outliers, i.e.
that exchange rate volatility is predictable to some extent. Estimation results presented in this
study confirm recent evidence that the GARCH model gives a good description of the statistical
properties of daily exchange rate returns on the U.S. dollar~eutsche mark market. With the
conditional vaziance modeled as a weighted average of the variance in past days with geometrical-
ly declining weights, the GARCH model can capture the stylized fact of clusters of lazge
DMldollar-returns. The time series for the conditional variance is derived from the estimated
GARCH model. T'he estimated coefficient for the conditional variance term in the intervention
reaction functions has the expected sign in all cases. It is found that an increase in the conditional
variance led the central banks to increase the volume of intervention, both in case of dollar-sales
and purchases on account of their "leaning against the wind" policy. In other words, both central
banks take full account of exchange mazket uncertainty with respect to their intervention policy.
There seem to be some good reasons for this accentuation of the central banks' presence on the
foreign exchange market. An increased conditional variance of daily exchange rate returns is apt
to cause "disorderly conditions" on the foreign exchange market and, if persistent, it has adverse
effect on the volume of international trade as well (Bini Smaghi (1991)).
13Appendix
In Tobit analysis, the likelihcx~d of each subsample has a component for the observations that are
positive (or negative, depending on whether the central banks bought or sold U.S. dollars) and a
component for the observations that are zero.
For the observations with INV, - 0 it is known that
~
dp f d, (S,P - 1~21 E S~yP~FN) ~~~,~ ~ c ~~
SO
7
Pr[INV,-O] - Pr [~,' C-do - d, (S,P - 1121 E S~~PIFN) - dz t4]
~
- Pr [p,'la C (-da - d, (S,P - 1121 E S,yP`FN) - dz hJla]
- 1-F,
where Pr denotes the expected probability and F, is the standard normal cumulative density
function evaluated at
~
(do -F d, (S,P - 1121 E S ~~PIFN) f dz hJlv.
For the T observations for which INV, is nonzero an ordinary probability density function applies.
The log-likelihood function is given by
~
L- Edn(1-FJ-(Tl2) In 2zr -(Tl2) ln az - E, (INV, -do - d, (S,P - 1121 E S,~,P~'u) - dz hJl2az
.-t
where Eo and E, denote the sum over the zero observations and the sum over the positive (first
subsample for both central banks) or negative (other subsamples) observations, respectively.
Amemiya (1973) proves that, if the log-likelihood is maximized, the ML estimators for this model
are consistent and asymptotically normal.
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' The authors are grateful to the Deutsche Bundesbank, Hauptabteilung Ausland for kindly providing the
daily data on the official interventions of the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve, to the extent that they
affected the net foreign position of the Bundesbank. Also, they want to thank Theo Nijman for helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this article. All remaining errors aze the sole responsibility of the
authors.
1.Goodhart and Hesse ( 1991) reveal some interesting aspect of the timing of foreign exchange
intervention.
2.Goodhart and Hesse (1991) assess central bank foreign exchange mazket intervention virtually in
continuous time. However, their investigations aze based on reported intervention observations
which appeared on Reuters screen information. This gives a far from exact representation of
actual intervention operations. Moreover, reported intervention observations do not contain
information on the actual amount of intervention.
3.Data for the opening, fixing and closing dollaz-DM rate are taken from: Statistische Beihefte zu
den Monatsberichten der Deutschen Bundesbank, Reihe 5: Die W~hrungen der Welt, Februar
1985-November 1990, Tabelle 6: Kassa-Kurse des US dollar in Tagesverlauf.
4.Data on the official interventions of the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve, to the extent that they
affected the net foreign position of the Bundesbank, were kindly provided by the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Hauptabteilung Ausland on a confidential base. Therefore, this study comprises no
exact data, nor any figures of these interventions.
S.Empirical evidence on the relation between trade balance announcements and exchange rate
movements is presented in, e.g., Hogan et al. (1991) and Eijffinger and Gruijters (1992).
6.Eijffinger and Gruijters (1991) compaze a three-days, five-days and seven-days moving average,
respectively. This study, however, concentrates on a seven-days moving average only, because
this generally turned out to give the best empirical results.
7.The constant is a con.sequence of the monthly or quarterly base of the data on "fundamentals"
(inflation, money growth, balance of payments accounts, etc.). These data would lead to rather
sticky regressors for the "fundamentals" in a daily model of exchange mazket intervention.
8.However, if the smoothing or "leaning against the wind" coefficient unexpectedly has a positive
sign, then the centra( bank concerned actually reacts by a policy of "leaning with the wind" and
thus amplifies the exchange rate volatility in the short-run. Such a policy is expected to be an
exception.
I~9.The following statement made by Gleske (1982, p. 265) relates to this interaction: 'Under
certain circumstances, only small interventions may suffice to curb or even reverse an unwanted
movement in the exchange rate. In other cases even large interventions may result in the opposite
effect; when market participants aze convinced of the strength of a fundamental trend..." (ottr
translation).
lO.An increase in exchange rate volatility does not necessazily have to lead to a decline in the
volume of trade. An income and a substitution effect aze at work. The substitution effect of
resources shifted away from the traded-goods sector when volatility increases may be dominated
by an income effect working in the opposite direction. De Grauwe (1988) shows that this is the
case if producers are sufficiently risk averse and increase resources in the export sector to offset
the drop in expected utility of export revenue caused by the rise in exchange rate volatility.
11.The variance equation in (5) can be rewritten as
h, - a2 ~- a E B' (E~.r~Z - aZ),
with oZ - al(1-~-13).
12.Periods of prolonged interventions in one direction were selected to rule out the possibility that
"negative" interventions are simply observed opposite interventions (i.e. selling instead of buying
and vice versa)
~eTable 1 OLS estimation resultsfor the reaction function in (4)
~
INV,near~n - ao f a~ (S,P - 1121 E SHr~iu)
.-i
period ao a, R2 DW Obs.
Deutsche Bundesbank
9:87-1:88 0.035 -2.957 0.241 1.41 105
(3.18) (-5.83)
6:88-9:88 -0.138 -4.490 0.086 1.59 86
(-4.87) (-3.00)
12:88-3:89 -0.029 -2.695 0.152 1.59 84
(-2.64) (-3.98)
8:89-10:89 -0.028 0.867 0.066 1.36 66
(-2.89) (2.36)
Federal Reserve System
10:87-1:88 0.036 -2.044 0.117 1.35 83
(2.54) (-3.45)
6:88-9:88 -0.080 -4.444 0.137 1.23 86
(-3.63) (-3.80)
1:89-0:89 -0.102 -4.344 0.150 1.67 124
(-5.25) (-4.76)




R Z is the squared multiple correlation coe~cient adjusted for degrees of freedom
DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic for first-order autocorrelation.
Obs. gives the number of observations for each period.
~9Table 2 Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the parameters ofthe GARCH mode!
(see equation (S))
bo x a B IogL Q(12) Qz(12) m, m. LR(2)
0.015 0.021 0.073 0.874 -649.34 10.29 20.63 0.04 4.29 35.68
(0.65) (2.77) (4.47) (31.51)
Notes:
t-statistics in parentheses.
m, and m. give the sample skewness and kurtosis for the residuals respectively.
Q(12) and Q'(12) refer to the Ljung-Box portmanteau test for up to 12'th order serial correlation
in the levels and the squares of the residuals respectively. The critical value for a 596-level test is
21.0.
LR(2) gives the value of the test statistic for the likelihood ratio test under the nullhypothesis that
the variance is conditional homoskedastic Ho: a-0,6-0. As the alternative hypothesis is H,:
a z0, B Z0, the LR-statistic does not have a X 2-distribution with two degrees of freedom. The
tabulated critical value for a 596-level test is 5.135 (Kodde and Palm (1986).
20Table 3 OLS estinwtion results for the intervention reaction function including
conditional variance (see equation (6))
~
INV,neei~ - Co ~- Ci (~P - 1121 E SS,,,wFN) ~~ hi
~-1
OLS co c, c1 RZ DW Obs.
Deutsche Bundesbank
9:87-1:88 -0.034 -3.156 0.134 0.284 1.56 105
(-1.21) (-6.34) (2.68)
6:88-9:88 0.105 -5.514 -0.588 0.151 1.75 86
(1.13) (-3.69) (-2.72)
12:88-3:89 0.047 -2.646 -0.213 0.165 1.63 84
(0.92) (-3.94) (-1.50)
8:89-10:89 0.130 0.723 -0.285 0.298 1.57 66
(3.75) (2.26) (-4.71)
Federal Reserve System
10:87-1:88 -0.076 -2.573 0.192 0.192 1.56 83
(-1.87) (-4.32) (2.91)
5:88-9:88 0.226 -5.733 -0.740 0.313 1.38 86
(3.35) (-5.32) (-4.75)
1:89~i:89 -0.012 -4.423 -0.207 0.172 1.77 124
(-0.26) (-4.91) (-2.08)




2~Table 4 Tobit regression results for tlu intervention nuction junction including
conditional variance (see equation (7))
a ~oaetrm : ~ t dt(S~- 21 ~ S~~u) } ~r
period do d, dz LogL Prob. LR(2) Obs.
Deutsche Bundesbank
9:87-1:88 -0.448 -9.998 0.384 -216.02 0.1425 41.65 105
(-3.79) (-5.31) (2.16)
6:88-9:88 0.327 -7.074 -0.911 -429.50 0.6421 15.50 86
(2.45) (-3.40) (-3.06)
12:88-3:89 0.252 -9.140 -0.291 -223.08 0.2530 28.98 84
(2.03) (-4.34) (-0.87)
8:89-10:89 0.522 0.824 -0.704 -122.72 0.0754 15.00 66
(3.78) (0.86) (-3.47)
Federal Reserve System
10:87-1:88 -0.877 -10.245 0.869 -148.07 0.0821 22.54 83
(-3.41) (-3.74) (2.62)
5:88-9:88 1.037 -14.971 -1.786 -214.88 0.1925 29.50 86
(4.25) (-4.35) (-3.78)
1:89-0:89 0.403 -9.510 -0.493 -381.74 0.2703 23.00 124
(3.23) (~.34) (-2.15)




Prob. gives the expected probability of an intervention volume larger (in the first subsample for both
central banks) or smaller (in the other subsample) than zero.
LR(2) gives the value of the test statistic for the likelihood ratio test that the ezplanatory vaziables, other
than the constant, have no impact on the volume of intervention. The critical value for a 596-level test for
Ho: d,-d2-0 is 5.99.
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